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CREDITOR'S DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
Effect of Lack of Notice and a Commercially Reasonable Sale
Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan'
Upon default by a debtor in a security agreement, a secured
creditor may, pursuant to Part 5 of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, repossess and dispose of the collateral in order
to minimize the existing indebtedness. A problem, however, ex-
ists because, while the Code requires the secured creditor to no-
tify the debtor of the disposition' and to conduct the disposition
in a commercially reasonable manner,3 it fails to chart explicitly
the consequences that befall the secured creditor should he not
do so. Courts faced with the issue have not uniformly chastised
the misbehaving creditor. Rather, interpretation of the Code has
resulted in divergent remedies for the debtor and various penal-
ties for the creditor. One interpretation allows the debtor to treat
the contract as discharged, with the secured creditor's misbehav-
ior denying him the deficiency4 normally allowed when the dispo-
sition price does not meet the indebtedness. Another interpreta-
tion, however, accords the creditor his deficiency judgment;5 the
1. 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972).
2. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(1) states that "[A] secured party after de-
fault may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral .. " Thus the
term "disposition" connotes any method the creditor utilizes to rid himself of the collat-
eral. Throughout the paper the terms "disposition" and resale will be used
interchangeably.
3. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(3).
4. Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(2) with UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 9-504(1). The Uniform Commercial Code abrogated the common law doctrine of elec-
tion of remedies by authorizing a deficiency after repossession and dispostion. See Swindel
v. General Fin. Corp., 265 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1972).
5. Deficiency is defined as "[T]hat part of a debt secured by a mortgage [security
agreement] not realized from the sale of mortgaged [secured] property." BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 510 (4th ed. 1968) citing Harrow v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 285 Mich. 349,
280 N.W. 785, 787 (1938). "A judgment or decree for the amount of such deficiency is
called a 'deficiency judgment' or 'decree'." Id., citing Phillips v. Union Central Life Ins.
Co., 88 F.2d 188, 189 (1937) and Grace v. Hendricks, 103 Fla. 1158, 140 So. 790, 794 (1932).
Technically speaking, there is no such thing under our law as a "deficiency judg-
ment" in the sense that a formal judgment of that description is rendered by the
court, or entered by the clerk for the amount not made by the sale of the mortgaged
[secured] property. There is only the original judgment for the full amount of the
indebtedness, upon which a deficiency may exist after the issuance and return of
the special execution, or even perhaps of one or more general executions in addition.
It has nevertheless been customary in ordinary parlance to refer to the amount still
due after the return of the special execution as a "deficiency judgment."
Id., citing Bank of Douglas v. Neel, 30 Ariz. 375, 247 P. 132, 134 (1926).
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debtor's remedy then is to sue for affirmative relief under section
9-507(1). 6
The problem is nicely explicated in Atlas Thrift Co. v.
Horan,7 a recent California Court of Appeals case. Plaintiff, Atlas
Thrift Company, being in the industrial loan business, entered
into a security agreement with the defendant's son-in-law, who
wished to purchase equipment for a delicatessen business. The
defendant, who had successfully done business with the plaintiff
in the past, orally assured plaintiff that he was backing his son-
in-law as a "silent partner".' Thereafter, the son-in-law went
bankrupt. Plaintiff obtained a release of the secured collateral
from the trustee in bankruptcy and sold the fixtures and equip-
ment to itself for $2,000 at a "public sale" in its own office. While
there was notice of the sale by publication, neither the defendant
nor his son-in-law received personal notice or notice by mail.
Plaintiff then sued for a deficiency judgment, i.e., the differ-
ence between the resale proceeds and the amount of the loan still
outstanding. Defendant maintained that his lack of notice of the
resale should preclude plaintiff from recovering the deficiency.,
6. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-507(1). In general this section allows the debtor
to "recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure [of a secured creditor] to
comply with the provisions..." of Part 5.
7. 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1972).
8. As defendant's lease to his own delicatessen location prohibited him from engag-
ing in a similar business within twenty-five miles, the defendant did not actually sign the
security papers for his son-in-law's loan. At trial the defendant denied that he was a silent
partner and, therefore, a debtor. The trial court, however, as a finding of fact, which was
not challenged on appeal, determined that the defendant orally represented to plaintiff
that he was a partner and that in reliance the plaintiff lent the money. Thus, even though
he did not sign the security agreement, the defendant was found by the trial court to be a
debtor within the meaning of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-105(d) which states:
"Debtor" means the person who owes payment or other performance of the obliga-
tion secured, whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral, and includes
the seller of accounts, contract rights or chattel. Where the debtor and the owner
of the collateral are not the same person, the term "debtor" means the owner of
the collateral in any provision of the division dealing with the collateral, the obligor
in any provision dealing with the obligation, and may include both where the
context so requires.
Cf. Norton v. National Bank, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1969).
Plaintiff loaned defendant's son-in-law $10,000. The balance owed on the security
agreement at the date of the sale of the delicatessen equipment was $15,000. These
amounts, as findings of facts by the trial court, were not challenged on appeal.
9. For a discussion of what constitutes proper notice of sale, see 1 P. COOGAN, SE-
CURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 804(2) (1963 and 1971 Cum.
Supp.); II G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.6 [hereinafter
cited as GILMORE]; White, Representing the Low Income Consumer in Repossessions,
Resales and Deficiency Judgment Cases, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 808, 818 (1969-70) [hereinafter
cited as White]; Annot., 30 A.L.R. 3d 9, 80 (1970). In Maryland the Court of Appeals has
ruled that formal written notice of a public foreclosure sale is not necessary under section
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Defendant further asserted that-because the sale was conducted
in plaintiff's office, plaintiff purchased the equipment and the
price paid was substantially less than the value of the equip-
ment-the sale was conducted in a commercially unreasonable
manner;' 0 for that reason no deficiency should be allowed. The
plaintiff answered that defendant's recourse for the alleged mis-
conduct was not a denial of the deficiency but rather a suit or
counterclaim for affirmative damage relief. Thus, the issue before
the court was whether, in the absence of conclusive language in
the Code, the plaintiff creditor could recover a deficiency when
the creditor admits" that he has not complied with the Code
provisions.
Following the line of cases which deny a deficiency judgment,
the defendant debtor based his argument on section 9504 of the
California Commercial Code. That section implies that, unless
otherwise agreed, the debtor in a secured transaction is liable for
any deficiency which might exist after repossession and dis-
position of the collateral.'" However, the Code also provides that
"[a] sale or lease of collateral may be as a unit or in parcels, at
wholesale or retail and at any time and place and on any terms,
provided the secured party acts in good faith and in a commer-
cially reasonable manner." 3 Further,
9-504(3) as long as the person entitled to notice has received actual notice of the sale. Crest
Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Alatzas, 264 Md. 571, 287 A.2d 261 (1972). See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1-201(26) for the definition of "notice".
10. For a discussion of what constitutes a commercially reasonable sale, see 1 P.
COOGAN, supra note 9, at § 8.04(2)(a); H GILMORE, supra note 9, at §§ 44.5-44.6; White,
supra note 9, at 821; Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 9, 77 (1970); Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 15 (1956)
(discussing the rights and duties of parties to a conditional sales contract in regard to
resale of repossessed property, which discussion is basically applicable to the Uniform
Commercial Code provisions on resale). Adequacy of notice and of the sale is a jury
question. See, e.g., Leasing Associates, Inc. v. Slaughter & Son, Inc., 450 F.2d 174 (8th
Cir. 1971); Farmers' Equip. Co. v. Miller, 252 Ark. 1092, 482 S.W.2d 805 (1972); Goodin
v. Farmers Tractor & Equip. Co., 249 Ark. 30, 458 S.W.2d 419 (1970); Baber v. Williams
Ford Co., 239 Ark. 1054, 396 S.W.2d 302 (1965); First Nat'l Bank v. Rose, 188 Neb. 362,
146 N.W.2d 507 (1972).
11. That "plaintiff did not send written notice to the defendants . ..nor .. .
conduct a sale of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner" was a trial court
conclusion not disputed on appeal. 27 Cal. App. 3d at 1002, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
12. Section 9-504(1) and section 9-504(2) must be read together to reach this conclu-
sion. Compare CAL. Comm. CODE § 9504(2) (West 1964) with CAL. COMM. CODE 9504(1)
(West 1964). Note that the California Code has removed the dash from the section num-
bers of the Uniform Commercial Code so that, for example, section 9-504(2) of the Uniform
Commercial Code becomes section 9504(2) of the California Code.
13. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9504(3) (West 1964) (emphasis added). This language is
slightly different from UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(3) which states that "every
aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be
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[u]nless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline
speedily in value, or is of a type customarily sold on a recog-
nized market," the secured party must give to the debtor
• . . notice in writing of the time and place of any public
sale. . . . Such notice must be delivered personally or be
deposited in the United States mail postage prepaid ad-
dressed to the debtor . . . at least five days before the date
fixed for any public sale. . . .
While the Code does not take the next step and specifically say
that lack of good faith, of a commercially reasonable sale and of
notice as required by section 9504(3) should preclude the defi-
ciency allowed in section 9504(2), the defendant contended that
the Code implies such a forfeiture of the deficiency.
Relying on the other interpretation which grants a deficiency
to a misbehaving creditor, plaintiff argued that section 9507(1) of
the California Commercial Code adequately covers his failure to
perform in a reasonable manner by entitling the debtor to recover
from the secured party "any loss caused by a failure to comply
with the provisions [of the section on default (to include section
9504)] .. ."' The debtor's remedy could be in the form of an
independent suit or counterclaim, with any judgment acting to
offset and to minimize any deficiency judgment. Thus, since the
language of the section makes it the debtor's exclusive remedy,
and since absolving the liability of the debtor for a deficiency is
commercially reasonable". As a practical matter there is no difference between the two,
as UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-203 states that "[e]very contract or duty within this
Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement".
14. [A] "recognized market" might well be a stock market or a commodity
market, where sales involve many items so similar that individual differences are
nonexistent or immaterial, where haggling and competitive bidding are not primary
factors in each sale, and where the prices paid in actual sales of comparable prop-
erty are currently available by quotation.
Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 145, 398 S.W.2d 538, 540 (1966).
15. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9504(3) (West 1964) (emphasis added). This section is sub-
stantially different from UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(3) which merely provides
that "reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale . . . shall be sent
by the secured party to the debtor ... " This substitution in California of a definite
notice standard for the Code's reasonable notice standard was explicitly made to avoid
controversy in each case in determining what is reasonable. SixTH PROGRESS REPORT TO
THE LEGISLATURE BY SENATE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE BY THE SENATE FACT FINDING COMMIrr-
TEE ON JUDICIARY, PART I, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 587 (1959-61).
Note also that both the California and the Uniform Commercial Code in section 9-
504(3) allow the secured party to buy at a public sale. The creditor may also purchase
the collateral at a private sale if the collateral is customarily sold in a recognized market
or is subject to widely distributed price quotations.
16. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9507(1) (West 1964). UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-507(1)
is basically identical.
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not among the penalties set forth in section 9507(1), the debtor
is precluded from raising a creditor's failure to comply with sec-
tion 9504 as a defense to a deficiency action.
Defendant answered that section 1103 allows common law
principles to supplement the Code except in those instances in
which these principles are specifically displaced by provisions of
the Code. Therefore, because section 9507 does not state that it
is an exclusive remedy, the section is cumulative, and the law
existing in California regarding deficiency judgments should also
apply. California courts had previously held that failure to notify
the debtor extinguished the mortgage lien and barred a deficiency
judgment. 7
The trial court concluded that the defendant, as a debtor,
was entitled to notice, that notice was not given and that the sale
was not conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. Despite
these findings, the court awarded the plaintiff his deficiency judg-
ment.' 8 In reversing this decision, the Court of Appeals relied
basically on defendant's argument that the "most natural and
reasonable construction of the statutory language"' 9 requires that
to obtain the deficiency allowed by section 9504(2) the secured
party must comply with the literal conditions set forth in section
9504(3). Thus, failure to give notice and to conduct a reasonable
sale was a bar to the secured creditor's deficiency judgment.2 0
17. Methany v. Davis, 107 Cal. App. 137, 290 P. 91 (1930). The mortgagee failed to
demand payment from the mortgagor prior to the sale, to give him notice and to conduct
a lawful sale. Consequently, the mortgagee could not collect his deficiency.
18. The trial court, however, could not accept plaintiff's contention that the collat-
eral was worth only the $2000 paid for it at the sale. Failure to give notice may require
the secured party to prove the amount that should have been obtained at the sale of the
collateral. Further, if this burden of proof is not met, it will usually be presumed that the
collateral is worth the amount of the debt. See note 59 infra and accompanying text. In
Atlas the trial court found that plaintiff met the burden of proof and thereby avoided the
presumption by introducing into evidence the Security Agreement which stated the price
of the collateral to be $12,500. Therefore, taking plaintiff's admission of value of $12,500
and adding to that $500 in payments made and subtracting that sum from the $15,000
due, the deficiency judgment totaled $2000. While affirmative action by the debtor was
not mentioned in the trial court's opinion, presumably defendant could thereafter sue for
affirmative relief under section 9507(1). 27 Cal. App. 3d at 1005-6, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315, 319.
19. Id. at 1009, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
20. For the court's specific reasons for so holding, see the text accompanying notes
36 and 52 infra. Defendant in Atlas Thrift secondarily contended that granting of the
deficiency judgment would be an unlawful imposition of a forfeiture or penalty because
the $2000 judgment partially reflected a full five years interest on eight months use of the
$10,000 loaned (interest at seventy-five percent per annum for eight months). The court
in dicta agreed. Noting the split of authority, the court rejected the line of cases which
hold that acceleration clauses are to be construed to accord the lender on default the right
to demand payment of the debt with interest for the full loan period since such payment
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The decisions of both the trial and appeals courts point out
the two divergent views taken by the courts when they are con-
fronted by a creditor who has not complied with the Code but who
is asking for a deficiency. Whether the creditor can recover can
not be determined conclusively from the literal language of sec-
tion 9-504 of the statute. The courts rather must look to the
general purpose of the Code, to other sections of the Code, such
as the section providing for redemption, and to principles of law
existing prior to the promulgation of the Code in order to reach a
conclusion.
JURISDICTIONS DENYING THE DEFICIENCY
While jurisdictions denying the entire deficiency are not in
agreement as to the basis and reason for their conclusion, many
have come to their conclusion by analyzing the common law and
the uniform acts culminating in the Uniform Commercial Code.
At common law, in the absence of contractual provisions to the
contrary, repossession of the collateral by the secured creditor or
conditional vendor constituted a rescission of the contract."1 Con-
tracts were then developed to authorize the seller to sell the goods
for the debtor, to credit the debtor's account and to hold the
debtor to any deficiency. Because this arrangement worked to the
disadvantage of the debtor, 2 statutes were passed in many juris-
dictions to govern the problems of repossession and resale. The
most important of these statutes was the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act23 of which sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 were devoted to the
is a contractual penalty which the debtor could avoid by paying the due installments.
Instead, the court invoked the rule that collection or retention of interest charged on the
principal after default is excessively penal; the court compared the situation to the cases
of "collection under duress" and foreclosure in which the courts will not enforce "grossly
unfair and unconscionable demands or penalties or forefeitures." Id. at 1010, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 322. It is thus feasible that a rule might develop which would deny deficiencies
when the bulk of the deficiency is made up of credit service charges.
21. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 15, 19 (1956).
22. Id.
23. The Uniform Conditional Sales Act, adopted by thirteen jurisdictions, has today
been superseded by the Uniform Commercial Code, Also applicable to the problems of
repossession and disposition was section 6 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, passed by
forty jurisdictions. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act has too been repealed by the Code.
Cases interpreting the repossession and disposition sections of the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act with regard to the creditor's right to a deficiency will be discussed throughout
the text; there do not appear to be any cases, however, interpreting section 6 of the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act in this regard. Maryland never enacted the Uniform Condi-
tional Sales Act but did enact the Uniform Trust Receipts Act which until repealed by
ch. 538 [19631 Md. Laws 786 was found in MD. ANN. CODE art. 95V2, §§ 1-20 (1957). Still
existing in Maryland is the Retail Installments Sales Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, §§ 128-
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problems of repossession and disposition.
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act was quite specific in its
resale and notice requirements. The sale had to be by public
auction; the seller had to give the buyer at least ten days notice
before the sale; the sale had to occur within thirty days after
retaking; and if $500 or more had been paid on the purchase price,
there had to be notice of sale by publication in a newspaper at
least five days before the sale.24 The Act recognized deficiencies25
and the right of a buyer to recover from the seller any actual
damages incurred if the seller did not comply with the disposi-
tion, redemption, proceeds and retention sections. 2
The courts in adjudging deficiency actions required the seller
to comply strictly with those requirements before a deficiency
could be obtained," despite the language of the Act (like the
language of the Code) which did not specifically link the right to
secure a deficiency judgment with the obligation to give notice
and to conduct a reasonable sale and despite the specific provi-
sions allowing the debtor to recover actual damages if the condi-
tional vendor violated the sections requiring notice and resale. A
deficiency judgment was very hard to obtain under the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act; in addition, mere technical noncompli-
ance with the statute might subject the seller to the penalty pro-
visions of section 25.2 Thus, under the Act it was possible that
failure to comply with notice and resale provisions not only would
discharge the buyer from the contract but would accord him the
153 (1969) of which sections 140 through 145 deal with repossession and disposition of
goods by the seller in an installment sales contract with a consumer. See note 66 infra.
24. UNIFORM CONDIONAL SALEs AcT §§ 19-20.
25. UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALEs Acr § 22.
26. UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALs Acr § 25, which also provided that in no event
would the buyer recover "less than one-fourth of the sum of all payments which have been
made under the contract, with interest".
27. See, e.g., Frantz Equip. Co. v. Anderson, 37 N.J. 420, 181 A.2d 499 (1962)
(failure to comply with provisions of the conditional sales law not only deprived the vendor
of this right to a deficiency judgment but also exposed him to imposition of damages);
Berger Auto Co. v. Mattarochio, 58 N.J. Super. 161, 155 A.2d 787 (1959); Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 1091, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13, 15
(1971). A few cases interpreting the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, however, did hold that
substantial compliance was sufficient to support a deficiency. See, e.g., Bulldog Concrete
Forms Sales Corp. v. Taylor, 195 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1952) (substantial compliance is
sufficient, absent a showing of prejudice to the buyer or debtor); Schabler v. Indianapolis
Morris Plan Corp., 142 Ind. App. 319, 234 N.E.2d 655 (1968).
28. 11 GILMORE, supra note 9, at 1263 & n. 7 citing Commercial Credit Corp. v.
Swiderski, 195 A.2d 546 (Del. Super.) motion for rehearing denied, 196 A.2d 214 (Del.
Super. 1963) wherein the debtor recovered affirmative relief and the creditor was denied
a deficiency. Cf. Frantz Equip. Co. v. Anderson, 317 N.J. 420, 425, 181 A.2d 499, 505
(1962).
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right to sue for affirmative relief.
While it is true that the Code is more flexible in its resale and
notice requirements since it permits private as well as public
sales, allows reasonable notice and requires that the sale need be
only commercially reasonable, the basic outline is the same. This
similarity of provisions led the New York court in Leasco Data
Processing Equipment Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co.2 9 to interpret the
Code's silence concerning the question of the right to a deficiency,
where the creditor has not precisely complied with the Code, as
manifesting the intent that the Uniform Conditional Sales Act
case law should also apply to the Code. In other words, if the
authors of the Code had wanted to overrule the great majority of
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act case law denying deficiencies
when the Act has been contravened, they would have done so in
clear and unambiguous language.30
It is important to note that Atlas Thrift is a California case
and that with respect to notice provisions the California Code is
similar to the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, i.e., notice must be
given five days before the sale, and there must be notice by publi-
cation five days before the sale if the value of the collateral is over
$500. Thus, it would seem even more logical for California courts
to follow the Act's case law. Atlas Thrift, however, does not spe-
cifically follow this reasoning, probably because California never
enacted the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, and the court did
not, therefore, deem it necessary to compare and to contrast the
two enactments.
3
'
This approach is not entirely satisfying, however, because
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act's case decisions requiring lit-
eral compliance with the Act's resale provisions prior to allowing
a deficiency rarely bothered to argue or discuss the point, it being
"too obvious to require either a reasoned analysis or citation to
precedent."32 Nevertheless, what was clear under the Act may be
29. 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 1091, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13, 15-16 (1971).
30. In fact, the 1972 revision of the Code, which concentrated on changing Article
9, continued this silence. Perhaps an equally plausible reason is that the drafters view this
as an area where uniformity among jurisdictions is not necessary. However, such a view
violates one of the basic purposes of the Code which is to "make uniform the law among
the various jurisdictions". UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(I)(c).
31. Note, however, that the Atlas Thrift decision relies very heavily on Leasco and
that Leasco relied very heavily on the fact that the New York case law interpreting the
Conditional Sales Act denied all deficiency actions where there was not precise compli-
ance with the Conditional Sales Act. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt
Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 1091, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13, 15 (1971).
32. I GILMORE, supra note 9 at 1263. See, e.g., Frantz Equip. Co. v. Anderson, 317
N.J. 420, 155 A.2d 787 (1959). Many of the Code cases too are devoid of real analysis. See,
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equally clear under the language of the Code; moreover, denial
of deficiencies may even be a more reasonable holding under
Article 9 inasmuch as the enormously complicated procedures of
the Act have been replaced by rather minimal standards3 3 which
are not too difficult, oppressive or unfair to satisfy before the
creditor can sue for a deficiency.
While it may be said that it is unfair to interpret the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act and the Code to deny a deficiency for non-
compliance with the statute even where there is no proof proffered
to show that compliance would have aided the debtor, statutes
exist and have existed which, upon any noncompliance by the
creditor, allow a debtor to recover finance charges already paid,
permit treble damages and apply criminal penalties and accord
recovery of the total amount paid plus a license to keep the collat-
eral bought or secured without offset for its use.34 Compared to
these statutory penalties, the Code's denial of a deficiency to a
misbehaving creditor is moderate."
Both Atlas Thrift and Leasco, in holding that notice and a
commercially reasonable sale are conditions precedent for a re-
covery of a deficiency, primarily base their conclusion on textual
analysis of the applicable Code sections. As Leasco explains:
It surely has meaning that the very section (9-504) that af-
firms the right to a deficiency judgment after sale of a repos-
sessed article also describes in simple and practical terms
the rules governing dispositions as well as the pertinent no-
tice requirements. If a secured creditor's right to a deficiency
judgment were intended to be independent of compliance
with those rules, one would surely expect that unusual con-
e.g., Cities Service Oil Co. v. Ferris, No. 3693-RK (2d Dist. Ct. of Mich., 1st Div., July
19, 1971), 9 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 899 (Mich. 1971).
33. I GILMORE, supra note 9 at 1263-64. Gilmore concludes that "the secured party's
compliance with the default provisions of Part 5-both the formal requirements of notice
and the like and the substantial requirement of a 'commercially reasonable' sale-is a
condition precedent to the recovery of a deficiency." Id. at 1264. In summary: "The
conclusion is inescapable that the prior interpretation continues to be applicable under
the U.C.C., and that the failure of this plaintiff to follow the quite modest notice require-
ments of 9-504(3) defeats absolutely the claim here asserted." Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 1092, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13, 16 (1972).
34. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9507, Comment 3 (West 1964) mentions the California
Unruh Act and the California Motor Vehicles Conditional Sales Act.
35. Note that the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-507(1) allows the debtor in the
case of consumer goods to recover from the misbehaving creditor as affirmative relief the
credit service charge plus ten percent of the principal amount of the debt or the time price
differential plus ten percent of the cash price.
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cept to be delineated with clarity. The natural inference that
the right depends upon compliance is forcefully underlined
by the joining of the two provisons in one section. 6
Therefore, according to Atlas Thrift and Leasco,37 a secured party
must obey the letter of the law in section 9-504(3) before he can
obtain a right to a deficiency judgment under the provisions of
section 9-504(2).
Moreover, the Code specifically provides that the noncom-
pulsory requirements of section 9-504 cannot be waived .3  The
Comments add that denying effect to a waiver or variation of the
specific rights of a debtor is a long standing and deeply rooted
attitude.3 9 Thus, courts would deny effect to a bilateral agree-
ment, made at the time of the security agreement, which would
waive the protective provisions of section 9-504; therefore, courts
should also disregard any unilateral actions-a commercially
unreasonable sale or a sale without notice-of the secured credi-
tor after repossession which have the same result as a waiver of
those provisions. 40 Indeed, a unilateral action by the secured cred-
36. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 1091,
323 N.Y.S.2d 13, 16 (1971). "The most natural and reasonable construction of the statu-
tory language . . . lead[s) to the conclusion that the right to a deficiency judgment
depends on compliance with the statutory requirements concerning dispositions and no-
tice." Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1009, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315, 321 (1972).
37. See also Morris Plan Co. v. Johnson, 271 N.E.2d 404 (Ill. App. 1971), which held
that when the secured creditor had repossessed and then resold to a second purchaser
without notice to the original debtor, the second purchaser had defaulted, and the creditor
had repossessed and had sold to a third purchaser, the original debtor was not liable for a
deficiency upon foreclosure by the creditor of the original note, and the original debtor's
legal interest in the collateral (as well as his equity of redemption) was entirely
extinguished.
38. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-501(3)(b), which states:
To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose duties on the secured
party, the rules stated in the subdivisions referred to below may not be waived or
varied...
(b) Subdivision (3) of section 9-504 which deals with the disposition of collat-
eral.
Morris Plan Co. v. Johnson, 271 N.E.2d 404, 407 (Il1. App. 1971). Only the compulsory
provisions of section 9-504 may be waived, i.e., the provisions concerning the disposition
of perishable goods, of goods sold in a recognized market and of goods which decline
speedily in value. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-501(3). Section 9-501(3) does allow the
parties by agreement to set reasonable standards by which the fulfullment of the rights
and duties can be measured. Obviously, an agreement to dispense with notice is a waiver
and not a standard.
39. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-501, Comment 4.
40. Some courts, however, take the waiver provision to mean that there cannot be
a preemptive waiver in the security agreement, but that a debtor's actions at the time he
voluntarily turns over the collateral to the secured party-for example, a statement that
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itor after the goods have been repossessed is even more offensive
than a waiver by the debtor. To grant the creditor a deficiency
when he has ignored a nonwaivable requirement of the Code,
especially when the nonwaivable provisions are in the same sec-
tion which allows the deficiency, would contradict the rationale
for having the requirements nonwaivable.4'
Many of the courts which hold that compliance with section
9-504(3) is a condition precedent to recovery by the secured credi-
tor of a deficiency rely on the fact that the failure to notify denies
the debtor his statutory right to redeem. 4 Normally, a contract
which forecloses the right of redemption is void as against public
policy.4 3 As said in Skeels v. Universal C.I. T. Credit Corp.,"
It seems to this Court, however, that to permit recovery
by the security holder of a loss in disposing of collateral when
no notice has been given, permits a continuation of an evil
he does not intend to bid at any sale-can be effective as estoppel and waiver. See, e.g.,
Nelson v. Monarch Inv. Plan, Inc., 452 S.W.2d 375 (Ky. 1970); Grant County Tractor Co.
v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972). This view, however, seems to be easily
criticizable in light of the specific and unilateral language in section 9-501(b) that there
can be no waiver of subsection (3) of section 9-504 (dealing with the disposition of the
collateral) and in light of the fact that when a debtor voluntarily turns over malfunction-
ing collateral to the seller he is often likely to be so irritated that he could inadvertantly
say something which could be construed by the creditor to be a waiver. In this case,
therefore, he should later be protected by the Code's requirements.
41. Admittedly this waiver argument does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
the deficiency should be denied the creditor. However, it seems more likely in a waiver
situation that courts will apply the strictest penalty.
42. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-506 which states: "At any time before the se-
cured party has disposed of collateral or entered into a contract for its disposition . . . or
before the obligation has been discharged . . . [by retention] the debtor . . . may . . .
redeem the collateral by tendering fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collat-
eral. ... Redemption, however, is often criticized. See, e.g., II GILMORE, supra note 9,
at 1216; Note, Secured Transactions-New Jersey Upholds the Right of a Secured Party
to Collect a Deficiency Judgment Under UCC 9-504(2) Although Notice Provisions of 9-
504 Were Not Served, 76 DICK L. REv. 394, 400 (1972). Gilmore notes that the original
purpose of redemption was to keep ownership of land in the mortgagor and his family but
that today there is no concern in keeping stability in land tenure. Yet, redemption lingers
and permeates areas other than real property, including the area of secured collateral. Also
"we recognize that the defaulting debtor never does in fact cure the default and redeem
his property, so that the preservation of his right to do so merely adds complication and
expense to the secured party's attempt to devote the collateral to payment of the
debt. . . . But the burden of three centuries of history is not easily sloughed off."
GILMORE, supra note 9 at 1216. The law review note indicates that section 9-507(1) is
adequate to protect the debtor's right to redemption and that the additional penalty of
denying the deficiency is not necessary. The real problem, the author concludes, is not
providing redemption but obtaining fair value for the collateral upon resale; therefore,
courts should emphasize sale procedures.
43. See, C.I.T. Corp. v. Haynes, 161 Me. 353, 212 A.2d 436 (1965).
44. 222 F. Supp. 696, vacated on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1963).
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which the Commercial Code sought to correct. The owner
should have an opportunity to bid at the sale. It was the
secret disposition of collateral by chattel mortgage owners
and others which was an evil which the Code sought to cor-
rect. . . . A security holder who disposes of collateral with-
out notice denies to the debtor his right of redemption which
is provided him in Section 9-506. In my view, it must be held
that a security holder who sells without notice may not look
to the debtor for any loss.45
Therefore, according to Skeels, failure to notify denies the
debtor the right to redeem the collateral before the sale and to
bid at the sale." As a close adjunct, failure to notify prevents the
debtor from attending the sale merely to bid up the price, from
finding his own buyer or from having his friends and acquaint-
ances be present at the sale to bid; all of these actions would
ensure that the collateral will not be sold at less than its true
value. Giving notice seems especially important in allowing the
debtor to find his own buyer. In such a case the debtor could have
the buyer attend the sale, or the debtor could redeem and sell the
collateral directly to the buyer. For example, in Atlas Thrift, the
defendant, who was in the delicatessen business, conceivably
could have redeemed the equipment himself or notified his ac-
quaintances in the profession that such equipment was for sale.
In denying a deficiency it is also possible that some courts
could use the mortgage principle that when a mortgagee takes
possession and sells to a third person without following the
method of sale prescribed by law, the sale amounts to a conver-
sion of the property by the mortgagee with the result that the
mortgage lien is extinguished and with it the mortgage debt.
Thus any deficiency is denied.47 Such disposition is an unlawful
assumption of dominion contrary to the debtor's rights and incon-
sistent with the mortgage lien. Such illegal act, therefore, de-
45. 222 F. Supp. at 702. Note that Skeels recognized that notice may be waived. Id.
Also holding that failure to notify the buyer from exercising his right to redemp-
tion and that, consequently, a deficiency should be denied in Braswell v. American Nat'l
Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968).
46. Even cases according the deficiency recognize that notice for redemption pur-
poses is important in protecting the debtor. See Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp.,
57 Tenn. App. 106, 415 S.W.2d 347 (1966).
47. Methany v. Davis, 107 Cal. App. 137, 290 P. 91 (1930); Rocky Mountain Export
Co. v. Colquitt, 179 Cal. App. 2d 204, 3 Cal. Rptr. 512 (1960). Since Atlas Thrift cites
Methany and Colquitt as prior California law controlling the decision, it seems, therefore,
that the conversion theory underlies the conclusion in Atlas Thrift although the holding
in Atlas Thrift was specifically based on statutory construction.
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prives the mortgagee of his security and his right to maintain an
action on the note evidencing the mortgage. 8
A finding by the court of accord and satisfaction will also
lead to a denial of the deficiency. In Moody v. Nides Finance
Co.," the debtor sent her sister-in-law to the creditor to pay the
late monthly payment. The creditor refused the payment and
asked for the keys to the car. The sister-in-law turned over the
keys; after having driven the car the creditor announced that he
had his money's worth in the car and that he was going to keep
it. Thereafter the car was sold at a private sale without notice to
the debtor, in violation of the contract provision that upon de-
48. No case has been found in which conversion specifically was deemed to bar
recovery for a deficiency. The buyer in Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alas.
1969) counterclaimed for conversion and damages under section 9-507(1) for an improper
sale when the secured creditor sued for a deficiency. After granting the deficiency the court
refused to follow the debtor's contention that, because the creditor failed to furnish him
with notice of the sale, the creditor was liable in damages under section 9-507 for conver-
sion of the trucks. The court held that there was no conversion since the creditor had the
right to repossess the trucks under the terms of the retail installment contract and pur-
suant to the Code. An interesting fact was that the defendant debtor did not even attempt
to argue that because of the alleged conversion the secured creditor should be denied his
entire deficiency.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503 states that the "secured party has on default the
right to take possession of the collateral" and can so act without judicial process if no
breach of the peace occurs. Query, however, whether Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
may cause more frequent use of the conversion theory by the debtor not only in suits for
damages under section 9-507(1) but also as a bar to deficiency judgments entirely. In
Fuentes the Supreme Court ruled that prejudgment replevin statutes worked a depriva-
tion of property without procedural due process of law insofar as they denied debtors the
right to an opportunity to be heard before chattels were repossessed by state agents. The
holding will certainly have some effect on the question at hand. If it is wrong to use a
sheriff to repossess without a hearing, perhaps it is just as wrong for the creditor to
repossess and resell without a hearing or in any case without strict compliance with notice
and resale requirements. In the narrow area where creditors use state agents to repossess,
Fuentes may render the notice question moot. At the hearing the creditor could easily
notify the debtor of the sale, but the creditor would have to do so specifically as to time,
place, and the other particulars. Still, however, there would be the problem of conducting
a commercially reasonable sale. Also, the fact that the Supreme Court is entering the area
of debtor's rights under the Code may lead the lower courts to take a hard line against
creditors and to construe strictly and literally such statutes as the Uniform Commercial
Code. Since courts denying deficiences base their holding on strict statutory construction
and since such a holding benefits the debtor, it may be used more often in the future.
However, the court in Fuentes said that theirs was a narrow holding; in addition, the
decision was a four to three decision. Perhaps it is just as likely that debtors will be
protected only in situations similar to that in Fuentes.
Note also that the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-505(1) provides that "if the debtor
has paid sixty percent of the cash price in the case of a purchase money security interest
in consumer goods or sixty percent of the loan in the case of another security interest in
consumer goods", the secured party must resell pursuant to section 9-504 within ninety
days. If he does not the debtor may recover for conversion under section 9-507(1).
49. 115 Ga. App. 589, 156 S.E.2d 310 (1967).
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fault the creditor could repossess and resell only if notice was
given. In a suit by the creditor demanding a deficiency the court
held that creditor's taking the keys and the car and giving no
notice of the sale denoted accord and satisfaction even though the
defendant had not so pleaded:
If the company had intended to hold the debtor for any defi-
ciency in connection with the selling of the car the prior
written notice called for in the contract should have been
given. This would have afforded the debtor opportunity to
pay off the obligation, or to arrange to interest somebody in
buying the car so that it might sell to her best advantage.'
Thus it seems that when faced with adequate facts-the creditor
by his actions indicates to the debtor that he intends to retain the
collateral-courts may hold that there has been accord and satis-
faction."
Finally, in denying a deficiency judgment to the misbehaving
creditor, certain courts have additionally concluded that section
9-507, which provides an affirmative cause of action to recover
damages sustained by the debtor as a result of the creditor's
neglecting to abide by Part 5 of Article 9, has nothing at all to do
with defenses to a deficiency action. This is best enunciated in
Leasco as cited by Atlas Thrift:
The plaintiff's contention that a secured creditor's right to a
deficiency judgment under the described circumstances is
limited only by the remedies set forth in 9-507 seems to me
a tenuous one indeed, apart from the fact that no such effect
was ever accorded the corresponding section in the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act ...
50. Id. at 590, 156 S.E.2d at 310. The court, while noting that the provisions of the
contract were very similar to the Code, declined to rely upon the Code to decide the case.
"We are content to rest the matter on accord and satisfaction which these facts would
authorize a jury to find though it appears that we could likely have reached the same result
by applying UCC provisions." Id. at 591, 156 S.E.2d at 312.
51. Something like accord and satisfaction is contained in the Code. See UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-505(2), which states that "a secured party in possession may, after
default, propose to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the entire obligation." See note
75 infra and accompanying text.
While the Georgia court in Moody seemingly used accord and satisfaction to deny a
deficiency merely as a fiction to avoid the Code and later Georgia courts have held under
the Code that reasonable notice is a condition precedent to recovery of a deficiency,
Edmondson v. Air Serv. Co., 123 Ga. App. 263, 180 S.E.2d 589 (1971); Braswell v. Ameri-
can Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968). Accord and satisfaction could
still be a helpful technique to deny a deficiency. See note 75 infra and accompanying text.
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. . . [S]ignificant is the special nature of the language
used: "the debtor or any person entitled to notification...
has a right to recover from the secured party any loss caused
by a failure to comply with the provisions of this Part." If
this were intended to authorize a defense to an action for a
deficiency judgment, it is hard to envisage language less apt
to that purpose. The words used plainly contemplate an af-
firmative action to recover for a loss that has already been
sustained-not a defense to an action for a deficiency. The
distinction between an affirmative action and a defense is a
familiar one, phrases that articulate the different concepts
are familiar in the law, and it is unlikely that the experi-
enced authors of the Uniform Commercial Code intended by
the above language to provide a limited defense to an action
for a deficiency judgment based on a sale that had violated
the simple and flexible statutory procedure. 52
As a corollary, according to Leasco and Atlas Thrift and
many other cases denying a deficiency due to creditor misbehav-
ior,53 a debtor not only may use the creditor's misbehavior as a
defense to a deficiency action but also may sue for damages under
section 9-507. As the remedies under section 9-507 and section 9-
504 are mutually inclusive, recovery under section 9-507 will not
preclude denial of the deficiency under section 9-504. If the credi-
tor wishes to obtain protection through the Code, receive his sta-
tutory right of a deficiency, and avoid a suit for damages, he must
strictly comply with the literal requirements of the Code as to
repossession, notice, resale and the debtor's right of redemption.
Because the literal requirements are relatively few, simple and
easy to perform, some jurisdictions are not adverse, upon finding
misbehavior, to deny creditors deficiencies and to accord debtors
damages.
JURISDICTIONS GENERALLY GRANTING A DEFICIENCY
Certain other jurisdictions, however, allow a deficiency
where the secured creditor fails to notify the debtor of the resale
or fails to conduct a commercially reasonable sale. In such cases
the debtor must utilize section 9-507(1) exclusively to sue affirm-
52. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 1091-
92, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13, 16 (1971) cited in Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999,
1008-9, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315, 321 (1972).
53. Cf. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Swiderski, 195 A.2d 546 (Del. Super.), motion
for rehearing denied, 196 A.2d 214 (Del. Super. 1963); Frantz Equip. Co. v. Anderson, 37
N.J. 420, 181 A.2d 499 (1962).
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atively to recoup damages caused by the creditor's errors. These
cases are premised on the idea that the spirit of commercial rea-
sonableness inherent in the Code requires that a secured party
should not be arbitrarily deprived of his deficiency when he has
contravened the Code: 4 neglect by the creditor to comply with
the Code may not affect the amount received at the resale and
consequently the deficiency owed. In many cases, had there been
compliance the amount received at the resale would have been
the same. Thus, it would seem unfair to deny the creditor his
deficiency.5" Moreover, where the debtor has suffered damage or
prejudice by the secured creditor's failure to give notice or to
conduct a commercially reasonable sale, the money's worth of the
harm may have no relationship to the amount of the deficiency.
It may be more or less than the deficiency. Therefore, the better
procedure, according to these cases, is to let the creditor recover
his deficiency and to allow the debtor to sue under section 9-
507(1) for compensation.
However, these cases do not mean that the creditor will al-
ways recover a deficiency. Where the sale is conducted pursuant
to the literal requirements of the Code, the amount received at
the sale will be considered to be the true value of the collateral,
and any deficiency will be awarded automatically. However, if
the creditor has failed either to give notice or to conduct a com-
mercially reasonable sale, he should have the burden of proof to
show that he did not prejudice the debtor's rights and that the
sale resulted in a fair and reasonable price for the collateral, 6
54. Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (1971). Conti
has been discussed in Note, Secured Transaction-New Jersey Upholds the Right of a
Secured Party to Collect a Deficiency Judgment Under UCC 9-504(2) Although Notice
Provisions of 9-504 Were Not Observed, 76 DICK. L. REv. 394 (1972). The Conti court notes
that its decision differs from the cases interpreted in New Jersey under the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act [Frantz Equip. Co. v. Anderson, 317 N.J. 420, 181 A.2d 499 (1962)
and Berger Auto Co. v. Mattarochio, 58 N.J. Super. 161, 155 A.2d 787 (1959)] simply
because the Code is more flexible and does not require the ten days notice demanded by
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. This is a weak argument in view of the Code's silence
on the question and the conclusion by certain courts and writers that the Code intended
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act case law to continue to be controlling. See notes 32
and 33 supra and accompanying text. The Conti court would presumably agree with the
Atlas Thrift decision since section 9504 of the California Commercial Code is similar to
the Conditional Sales Act in that it requires five days notice be given the debtor before
resale by the creditor.
55. Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87, 89 (Alas. 1969): "Under the evidence
adduced, we believe that the trial judge could conclude that reasonable men could not
find that appellant (debtor) suffered any damages by virtue of the appellee's (creditor's)
failure to give the notice of resale required .. "
56. Carter v. Ryburn Ford Sales, Inc., 248 Ark. 236, 451 S.W.2d 199 (1970); Conti
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because the proof incident to notice and resale are peculiarly
within the creditor's knowledge." If the secured creditor cannot
prove that the sale reflected the fair and reasonable value of the
collateral, most courts" will presume that the value of the collat-
eral sold without notice and without a commercially reasonable
resale is equal to the amount of the debt.59 Often though, the
secured creditor will be able to rebut this presumption and prove
a reasonable value that will accord him a deficiency. For exam-
ple, reasonable value may be held to be the amount stated in the
security agreement. In other cases experts will be called on to
testify as to the true value; book value is often used. Once the
creditor has established the reasonable value of the collateral, the
deficiency judgment will represent the amount by which the debt
exceeds that reasonable value. This deficiency will, more than
likely, be less than the difference between the debt and the actual
resale price. 0 Any other damages caused by the creditor's misbe-
havior will have to be collected by the debtor under section 9-
507(1) .61
Thus, according to the courts allowing a deficiency even
though the creditor has not complied with the Code, a sale of the
collateral without notice and absent a commercially reasonable
sale results in a prima facie rebuttable presumption that the
security was sold for less than its true value and that the true
value is sufficient to satisfy the debt. The burden is then on the
Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (1971); T & W Ice Cream,
Inc. v. Carriage Barn, Inc., 107 N.J. Super. 328, 258 A.2d 162 (1969).
57. Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. 106, 415 S.W.2d 347
(1966). In effect the creditor has two burdens of proof. At the outset the creditor must
prove that he has complied with the Code. Having failed that burden he must prove that
his actions in contravention of the Code did not harm the debtor.
58. One court actually inquired into the true value of the item sold. Massey-
Ferguson Fin. Corp. v. Hamlin, Tenn. App. Ct. Western Section, April 15, 1971, 9 U.C.C.
REP. SERV. 142 (Tenn. 1971).
59. See, e.g., Leasing Associates, Inc. v. Slaughter & Sons, Inc., 450 F.2d 174 (8th
Cir. 1971); Universal C.I.T. Credit Co., v. Rone, 248 Ark. 605, 453 S.W.2d 37 (1970);
Barker v. Horn, 245 Ark. 315, 432 S.W.2d 21 (1968); Norton v. National Bank, 240 Ark.
143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966). The operation of this rebuttable presumption would, of course,
extinguish the debt.
60. Universal C.I.T. Credit Co. v. Rone, 348 Ark. 605, 453 S'W.2d 37 (1970). For an
example of a computation of a deficiency using this method see note 18 supra.
61. These damages may be a larger sum than the deficiency. See, e.g., Conti Cause-
way Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (1971). Cf. Norton v. National
Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966); Abbot Motors, Inc. v. Ralston,
28 Mass. App. Dec. 35 (1964).
Courts that deny deficiencies because of a creditor's misbehavior theoretically could
award affirmative relief under section 9-507(1) to the debtor; however, they seldom do.
Thus, the only penalty to the creditor is often the loss of the deficiency.
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creditor to overcome these presumptions by showing the real
value of the collateral on the date it was sold or the price which
would have been paid by a purchaser had the sale been commer-
cially reasonable." The actual sale price will be disregarded ex-
cept in those instances in which the debtor stipulated that the
sale price represented the true value.
A good example of the uncertainty concerning whether a
creditor will be denied his deficiency for failing to comply with
the Code is Norton v. National Bank.13 There the court requested
amicus briefs from two members of the Permanent Editorial
Board of the Uniform Commercial Code. Although in both briefs
the defendant Norton was not recognized as a debtor and thus
was not entitled to notice, the briefs "concede[d] that the bank
acted improperly, that it should have given Norton an opportun-
ity to repurchase the contract, and that it is liable to Norton for
any damages he suffered as a result of the bank's misconduct."' 4
That Norton is not a debtor implies that he should not be liable
for any deficiency, since section 9-504(2) states that "the debtor
is liable for any deficiency." It is not clear from the opinion
whether the Board Members themselves drew this implication; in
fact, it seems that the award of damages would contemplate the
granting of a deficiency. However, avoiding these problems, the
Arkansas court rejected the editorial advice on the defendant's
status and also refused to deny the deficiency. 5
THE LAW IN MARYLAND
It is important in viewing the problem in Maryland to appre-
ciate that both the Retail Installment Sales Act" and the Uni-
62. Investors Acceptance Co. v. Talcott, Inc., 61 Tenn. App. 307, 454 S.W.2d 130
(1969). Leasco severely criticizes these presumptions as judicial fictions constructed to
mitigate and to alleviate harsh and unfair consequences which could more sensibly and
fairly be remedied by holding the secured creditor to the letter of the simple and flexible
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas
Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 1093, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13, 17 (1971).
63. 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966). An auto dealer to whom the debtor exe-
cuted a promissory note and a conditional sales contract sold the promissory note to the
creditor bank. The debtor defaulted, and the bank repossessed and resold the collateral
without notice to the debtor or the auto dealer. The bank sued the auto dealer for a
deficiency, which the trial court granted.
64. Id. at 146, 398 S.W.2d at 540.
65. The court did find the dealer to be a debtor entitled to notice, stating that if
the creditor could not prove the value that should have been obtained at the sale, it would
presume that the collateral was worth the amount of the debt.
66. MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, §§ 128-153 (1969). Section 141 controls repossession;
subsection (c) provides that five days after repossession the holder of the goods must notify
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form Commercial Code 7 may be applicable. In case of conflict the
requirements of the Retail Installment Sales Act prevail. As no
reported cases have arisen under the Retail Installment Sales Act
in regard to a creditor's right to obtain a deficiency, the specific
meaning of the provisions of the Act is in doubt. Under the Code,
however, there have been two cases touching this question. One,
Hawkins v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.," held that under
section 9-504 of the Commercial Code the plaintiff creditor had
sent the debtor sufficient notice and that, therefore, a deficiency
was proper. The court gave no indication of how it would have
ruled had the notice not been adequate.
A more recent case, Harris v. Bower,70 held that a secured
the buyer of his right to redeem, resale rights, liability for deficiency and the place where
the goods are stored and where repayment can be made. Section 142 provides for redemp-
tion. Section 143 indicates the conditions of resale and the allocation of the proceeds of
the sale, and states that, if upon resale of
goods having a cash price at the time of the purchase by the buyer in excess of two
thousand dollars . . . where the buyer has not paid at least 50% of the cash sale
price of the goods or where the buyer has paid 50% of the cash sale price but has
not requested a public sale . . . a deficiency arises [,] the buyer shall be liable for
said deficiency if the contract provides for such deficiency liability and if compli-
ance has been made with the other provisions of this subtitle including the notice
required by 141(c) of this subtitle.
Section 144 could be interpreted to limit section 143's applicability to a certain extent.
Section 144 notes that "when there is no resale pursuant to section 143, all obligations of
the buyer under this agreement shall be discharged and the holder may retain the goods
as his own property without obligation to account to the buyer." Thus, under section 144,
upon a resale of goods originally valuing less than $2000 the debtor cannot be held respon-
sible for a deficiency. Note also that section 143 seems to indicate that the buyer will be
liable for a deficiency only if the contract of sale provides for such liability.
The Maryland Retail Installment Sales Act was passed in 1941 to protect installment
buyers. Enactment reflected the belief that consumers are normally improvident and
careless and that they buy without knowing the seller's powers or without reading the
contracts. United States v. Bland, 159 F. Supp. 395 (D. Md. 1958). The Act covers any
contract for the retail sale of goods (all chattels personal having a cash price of $5000 or
less) under which part or all of the price is payable in installments, and where
the seller has retained a security interest in the goods sold or has taken collateral
security for the buyer's obligation, . . . [the Act applies to] any conditional sales
contract, any purchase money chattel mortgage and any contract for the bailment
or leasing of goods under which the bailee or lessee contracts to pay as compensation
a sum substantially equivalent to or in excess of the value of the goods. ...
Section 152(a) and (b). Thus it would seem that the Retail Installment Sales Act would
control consumer secured transactions when the amount is less than $5000, while the
Uniform Commercial Code covers those consumer transactions in excess of $5000 and all
other commercial secured transactions.
67. MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, §§ 101 to 10-104 (1964) (effective Feb. 1, 1964). For all
intents and purposes Article 9 of the Maryland enactment is identical to Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
68. MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 9-203(2) (1964).
69. 250 Md. 146, 242 A.2d 120 (1968).
70. 266 Md. 579, 295 A.2d 870 (1972).
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party's failure to attempt to sell a repossessed boat in a commer-
cially reasonable manner violated the terms of section 9-504 and
caused a reduction in the secured obligation by the amount of the
fair market value of the boat at the time the secured party took
possession and title. By so concluding the Court of Appeals seems
to have sided with the line of cases holding that a creditor's mis-
behavior will not deny him a deficiency. However, there is some
contrary language in the case, and absent is any reference to the
aforementioned presumptions as to value. 71
In 1966 Bower sold Harris a boat for $17,000. Harris executed
a promissory note for that amount, and to secure payment of the
note Bower received a chattel mortgage. Harris subsequently
died, and the debt could not be paid from his estate. Bower re-
fused in September of 1969 to accept return of the boat in ex-
change for the cancellation of the debt, and in October of that
year he reduced the note to a $19,762.50 judgment against Har-
ris' estate plus $1,976.25 in attorney's fees. After an unsuccessful
attempt to sell the boat through one advertisement in the Wash-
ington Star, Bower repossessed on March 30, 1970 and entered
title in his name. Testimony at trial indicated that in 1970 the
boat had a retail value of $13,900. After Bower's repossession,
there was very little effort made to sell the boat; nor were any
repairs made.
Eventually, Harris' wife discovered that Bower had retained
possession of the boat and filed a bill of complaint for an account-
ing, damages and other relief. 2 After the lower court ruled that
the value of the boat did not meet the amount of the judgment
and that it was not reasonable to expect Bower to retain the boat
in complete satisfaction of the obligation, it ordered that the boat
be sold at a judicial sale with the proceeds to be applied according
to section 9-504(1). If the proceeds did not meet the amount of
the judgment, Bower could then obtain a deficiency under section
9-504(2) .
Harris' wife appealed on two basic issues. The first conten-
tion was that the creditor accepted the boat in satisfaction of the
obligation pursuant to section 9-505(2). Recognizing that section
9-505(2) requires the secured party to send to the debtor notice
71. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
72. While not specifically stated as such, this action could be considered an action
under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-507(1) which states: "If it is established that the
secured party is not proceeding in accordance with the provisions of this Part disposition
may be ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions."
73. 266 Md. at 581, 295 A.2d at 873.
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of intended retention, the debtor's attorney argued that because
notice is required only to protect the secured party from a later
claim by the debtor that the collateral should have been sold, the
debtor is not precluded from proving that the collateral has in
fact been retained. Such retention would discharge the debtor
from any further liability." Noting that Bower had kept the boat
for seventeen months (two boating seasons), had legal title in his
name, and made no effort to dispose of the collateral for more
than nine months, the debtor concluded that, since actions speak
louder than words, the creditor should be considered to have
taken the boat in accord and satisfaction of the obligation.75
The court, however, could not accept the accord and satisfac-
tion position and denied this relief by saying that it could not be
in Bower's interest to retain the vessel and that in fact Bower had
previously refused to do so: "While we think Bower has come
perilously close to painting himself in a comer in this regard we
are unwilling in these circumstances to hold that what he has
done extinguished the entire debt."7 Thus, it seems that the
court would not be adverse to this type of an argument had the
facts been more favorable.7
The debtor's alternative argument, while unnecessarily com-
plex, narrows down to asking the court to credit the previous
judgment with the amount of $13,900, the appraised value of the
boat at the time Bower repossessed it. The debtor argued that
because the Chancellor in the accounting action below ordered a
judicial sale of the collateral, he must have found that the credi-
tor was not acting pursuant to Article 9. The Chancellor must
have found either that the creditor had not used reasonable care
pursuant to section 9-207 in the custody and preservation of the
boat while he possessed it or that the creditor did not make com-
mercially reasonable efforts to dispose of the boat pursuant to
74. Brief for Appellant at 5-6, Harris v. Bower, 266 Md. 579, 295 A.2d 870 (1972)
citing Northern Financial Corp. v. Chatwood Coffee, Inc., 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 674 (N.Y.
Supp. 1967). The argument, in other words, is that the creditor cannot keep the collateral
and claim the unpaid balance. The collateral must be liquidated at a sale before the
balance can be claimed. Id. citing Cox Motor Car. v. Castle, 402 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1966).
The problem here is that Bower sued on the note before he repossessed.
75. Brief for Appellant at 7-8, Harris v. Bower, 266 Md. 579, 295 A.2d 870 (1972)
citing Moody v. Nides, 115 Ga. App. 859, 156 S.E.2d 310 (1967).
76. 266 Md. at 582, 295 A.2d at 874.
77. For example, had there been no previous judgment against the debtor, had the
creditor not previously refused retention in satisfaction of the obligation or had the boat
been sold without notice as the car had been sold in Moody, the court may have found
accord and satisfaction.
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section 9-504(3).7s Expert testimony showed the value of the boat
on the day of repossession to be $13,900. Seventeen months later
when the boat was ordered to be sold, the boat was virtually
worthless. Thus, according to the debtor, the damage caused by
the creditor's commercially unreasonable action was $13,900,
which should be credited against the previous judgment.
More receptive to this argument, the court noted that the
debtor was on much firmer ground in contending that, with re-
spect to the possession of the boat, Bower did not act in a com-
mercially reasonable manner. In making its decision,7" however,
the court seemed to dwell on the creditor's failure to dispose of
the boat rather than on his conduct during the time he possessed
it. On this point the court cited only one case, Dynalectron Corp.
v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co.,8° for the purpose of showing what
a creditor is to do after repossession to be deemed to have pro-
ceeded in a commercially reasonable manner in selling the repos-
sessed collateral. Dynalectron stated that the creditor should
advertise in trade journals, display the collateral, make repairs on
the collateral to make it look attractive for resale, contact others
who operate similar collateral and negotiate with a broker. In
Harris, the court noted that Bower did not advertise in yachting
journals nor place the boat with a broker."'
Harris then quoted Dynalectron to the effect that "[a]s the
Court finds that the sale. . . was not accomplished in a commer-
cially reasonable manner, the plaintiff is not entitled to a defi-
ciency judgment against the defendant.""2 Charging Bower with
allowing the boat to depreciate ruinously over two boating sea-
sons, the court concluded that such action was not only commer-
cially unreasonable but also utterly lacking in common sense. But
rather than follow Dynalectron's no deficiency the court con-
cluded that, because the uncontroverted evidence showed the fair
market value to be $13,900 when Bower took title and possession
and because the value at the time of the trial was a great deal
less, the shrinkage in value would be attributed to Bower's con-
duct and, therefore, on remand, Harris' estate should be credited
78. See Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Marston, 29 Mich. App. 99, 185 N.W.2d 47 (1971)
(once a creditor is in possession of the collateral he must act in a commercially reasonable
manner toward the sale, lease, proposed retention or other disposition).
79. To reach its decision the court recognized Code sections 1-102(1), 1-203, 9-
504(3), 9-507(2) and the official comments to section 9-504 as being applicable.
80. 337 F. Supp. 659 (D. Okl. 1972) (improper sale of a repossessed leased aircraft).
81. That the boat in Harris was not sold does not distinguish Dynalectron, since the
main issue is the conduct of the creditor in attempting to dispose of the collateral.
82. Harris v. Bower, 266 Md. 579, 591, 295 A.2d 870, 875 (1972).
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with the value of the boat at the time of the repossession against
the previous judgment.
Thus, the Maryland Court of Appeals may in the future side
with the jurisdictions granting a deficiency, accord a misbehaving
creditor a deficiency and leave the debtor to recover for damages
to compensate for the creditor's commercially unreasonable ac-
tions. At least that is the factual result in Harris. The Harris
estate owed a debt reduced to judgment from which had been
subtracted a credit to produce a deficiency. However, the result
reached in Harris may be limited by the peculiar facts and proce-
dure of the case. As noticed in the cases previously mentioned,
the normal factual situation is that the seller repossesses, resells
without notice or in a commercially unreasonable manner, and
sues for a deficiency at which time the debtor invokes the defense
that the seller has not complied with the Code. In Harris there
was no resale, and there existed a final judgment on the note
evidencing the purchase price of the boat, a judgment which was
obtained before repossession. The existence of this judgment
forced the debtor to sue for accounting and damages rather than
defend in an action for a deficiency on the ground that the credi-
tor's misbehavior on resale should preclude the entire deficiency.
That the court used Dynalectron and mentioned Dynalectron's
disallowance of a deficiency judgment as dicta indicates that pos-
sibly the Maryland court may, with facts closer to those in
Dynalectron, deny a misbehaving creditor any deficiency, as one
line of cases has done. This conclusion is particulary compelling
in light of the fact that, unlike several of the cases previously
considered, the debtor in Harris did not try to argue that the
creditor's commercially unreasonable actions should preclude the
entire deficiency.8 Nor did the debtor argue that the reasonable
value of the boat at a timely resale would have been $13,900.11
The debtor probably believed that he had to take the affirmative
damage relief route because he could not directly attack the prior
judgment on the note, because evidence existed as to the actual
value of the collateral at the time of repossession and because no
actual resale occurred. Had there been no previous judgment per-
haps the debtor would have argued that the entire deficiency
should have been denied. Had there been no evidence of the
actual value of the collateral perhaps the debtor would have
83. Brief for Appellant, Harris v. Bower, 266 Md. 579, 295 A.2d 870 (1972).
84. Obviously whether the debtor argued damage relief or reasonable sale value the
result would have been the same - a credit of $13,900.
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argued that the value should be presumed to be the value of the
debt. 5 Had there been a sale at a reasonable price the debtor
might have argued that the reasonable value of the collateral
should have been used to assess the deficiency. Since there was a
previous judgment and since there was no actual resale it would
be easier to justify damages under the language of the Code,
which talks of deficiencies only after there has been a resale.
Consequently, the court could only directly address the issues as
presented by the appellant. That the court in dicta mentioned
language seemingly contrary to its conclusion indicates that the
Maryland courts may deny a deficiency in an appropriate fact
situation.
CONCLUSION
According to the jurisdictions which provide for a deficiency
by allowing the creditor to prove the reasonable value of the col-
lateral, theoretically the debtor is not being hurt by the creditor's
initial misconduct since the reasonable value represents the price
which would have been obtained in the market had there been
notice and a commercially reasonable resale.8 1 Practically, how-
ever, there is a question whether the failure of the creditor to act
reasonably at the time of the sale can ever be compensated for
by post hoc determinations of value. Market conditions and peo-
ple's predilections-both the debtor's and the prospective pur-
chaser's-are elusive and variable. What might and should have
happened on a certain day had the creditor acted in compliance
with the Code cannot really be adequately measured and deter-
mined after that day passes.
While the Code, in setting forth the specific procedures
which a creditor must perform, did not conclude that failure to
perform would preclude a deficiency, neither did the Code au-
thorize courts to apply a reasonable value in assessing the defi-
ciency. As the former conclusion derives from a more literal read-
85. Some cases . . . base the debtor's discharge from further liability on the
rationale that the secured party, in his failure to comply with the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, raised a presumption that the obligation and the collat-
eral were of equal value. . . . Where the courts base their decision on this presump-
tion, the record below invariably reveals that the secured party has failed to present
evidence of the actual value of the collateral and the debtor is thereby relieved from
further liability.
Brief for Appellant at 6, Harris v. Bower, 266 Md. 579, 295 A.2d 870 (1972).
86. Nor is the secured creditor being punished. He is liable only for a suit under
section 9-507 in-which the debtor must prove his actual damages.
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ing of the law and as it gives authority to the Code's specific
mandates to the creditor and as the latter conclusion would in-
voke many presumptions and inadequate measurement tech-
niques, the former seems the wiser interpretation. Further, since
the obligations on the creditor are rather simple, few and easy to
perform, the creditor should be penalized by a denial of a defi-
ciency when his actions frustrate the operation of actual market
conditions, thwart the debtor in redeeming or exercising his rights
at the sale and prevent the prospective purchaser from attending
a commercially reasonable sale.

